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The paper uses the Johansen cointegration approach to analyse long-run pricing strategies 
of pork and chicken retailers in Austria. Long-run retail pricing strategy is found to be 
dependent on market share and price elasticity of demand for product. A combination of 
mark-up pricing strategy for pork and a competitive pricing strategy for chicken is considered 
by retailers to yield maximum profit. Long-run price adjustment reveals linkages to pricing 
strategy. The versatility of the Johansen cointegration technique as a tool capable of 
analysing both competitive and imperfect market situations is also revealed. The paper 
recommends meat policy to be product specific rather than holistic. 
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Introduction 
Studies on long-run relationships relate economic variables in situations where any 
adjustments of the variables to positions of disequilibrium are assumed to have been 
completed (Charemza and Deadman, 1992, p. 57). It is, however, important to distinguish 
between the two types of long-run relationships – static equilibrium where the variables are 
assumed to be unchanging between periods, and stable equilibrium where all variables are 
changing at some constant rate. Most previous studies concerning long-run relationships 
between producer and retail prices are based on static equilibrium models of firm behaviour 
(e.g., Gardner 1975, Wohlgenant 1989, Griffith and Moore, 1991; McCorriston and Rayner, 
1998). These studies assume equality of supply and demand in the respective producer, 
retail and marketing-input markets. Due to the existence of short-run disequilibrium in 
markets and the fact that time is required for markets to clear, Heien (1980) points out that 
the static equilibrium model is not always appropriate since it has little to say about the time 
path from one equilibrium point to another. Especially, in oligopolistic markets, where a 
change in the behaviour of one firm is likely to lead to unspecified responses of rival firms, 
the entire future time path of choice variables changes as current decisions are made. For 
this reason, such markets are expected to lend themselves more easily to dynamic analysis. 
Beginning with Larue (1991), several recent studies have taken a stable (dynamic) 
equilibrium approach based on cointegration techniques. The advantage of the cointegration 
framework over other approaches is that it permits the joint modelling of short-run economic 
reactions, trends, long-run equilibria as well as the speed of adjustment. 
Usually, the application of cointegration techniques to studies involving relationships 
between farm (producer) and retail prices is implicitly based on perfectly competitive market 
assumptions (e.g., Larue, op. cit.; Palaskas, 1995; 1996). Related studies in which imperfect 
market assumptions are invoked have employed other approaches such as structural 
methods (e.g., Azzam and Pagoulatos, 1990; Holloway, 1991; Hyde and Perloff, 1998) and 
reduced-form techniques (e.g., Panzar and Rose, 1987; Hall, 1988; Zhoa et al., 1996) – 
among others. Barrett (1996) argues that the implicit perfectly competitive market 
assumption is flawed in that even if price differences exactly equal transfer costs, one cannot 
reasonably presume perfect competition, since this is equally consistent with monopolistic 
limit pricing, with collusive pricing by a spatial oligopoly (Faminow and Benson, 1990) or with 
Pareto inferior trade (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984). Using linear-quadratic models, however, 
Karp and Perloff (1989; 1993) have shown that the dynamic behaviour of oligopolistic 
markets is relatively more competitive than collusive. Theoretical support for this evidence 
includes Eichner (1973), who suggests three possible causes for this behaviour: larger 
elastic demand in the medium to longer term due to substitution effects; the probability of 
new firms invading the market; the fear of some sort of detrimental government intervention. 
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The current paper is motivated by the theoretical arguments of Barrett (op. cit.) and the 
empirical evidence provided by Karp and Perloff (op. cit.). The paper examines the existence 
of market power in the respective pork and poultry1 (“white” meat) meat markets in Austria by 
means of the Johansen cointegration technique. Verification of the market power parameters 
is made possible by imposing identifying restrictions on the cointegration space related to the 
respective price equations and testing whether restrictions implied by competition can be 
rejected. Presumably for dietary reasons, the demand preferences for meat in Austria have 
been shifting increasingly from beef and veal to pork and poultry since the 1970’s 
(Handschur, 1991). This observation provides some rationale for studying the pricing 
strategies of pork and poultry retailers and their implications for policy. At the heart of the 
problem is the fact that the Austrian food retail sector is one of the most concentrated in the 
OECD countries - currently placing third in Europe, after Finland and Switzerland. Thus, it 
can be envisaged that meat retailers exercise a high degree of market power. Also, the long 
run is considered because under imperfect competition, retailers are more likely to establish 
a price with long-run rather than short-run profits in mind and to maintain that price for a 
considerable period of time.  
The organization of the paper is as follows: section 2 describes the market characteristics; 
section 3 expounds the model employed in the study and summarises the Johansen 
maximum-likelihood (ML) technique; section 4 interprets the empirical results and section 5 
concludes. 
2. The Meat Market  
2.1 Policy Spectrum 
In Austria, livestock accounts for about 63% of the final output of agriculture. Meat also 
accounts for about 20% of the household budget for food. Policy makers have, therefore, 
increasingly shown concern for the price of meat paid by the consumer and that received at 
other stages in the marketing chain. In particular, policy makers worry that the incidence of 
imperfect competition, especially at the retail level, might prevent prompt and accurate 
adjustment in supply and demand conditions from one market level to another. Both regional 
and national policies have been engaged to alleviate these worries. For example, during 
Austria’s pre-EU membership negotiations, it was expected that two of the main elements of 
EU membership – participation in the Common Agricultural Policy and trade liberalization 
with the EU – would bring about lower producer and retail prices as well as a more accurate 
transmission of prices from one market level to another. Failure to realize these expectations 
would imply the existence of price signal distortion in the Austrian meat market and 
departure from EU membership objective. In 1998, the government demonstrated its 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 The term poultry as used in the paper comprises poultry, geese, duck, and turkey meat. 
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persistent effort towards achieving a more competitive domestic retail environment by 
preventing a take over bid of the Julius Meinl food retail chain (6.9% market share, 1997) by 
the German group Rewe which already owns Billa-Merkur-Mondo retail outlets (32.5% 
market share, 1997).  
2.2 Market Structure 
Figures 1 and 2 show that the trend of real2 farm and retail prices of meat in Austria have 
been falling gradually since the early eighties. These downward price movements may be 
explained by improvements in the productivity of breeding stocks and in the performance of 
feeder livestock (Jumah and Kunst, 1996). Other factors that might have influenced these 
price trends are improvements in labour productivity and the efficiency of marketing services. 
Figure 1: Real Producer and Retail Prices for Pork in ATS/kg (1973:1-1994:4)
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2 Real prices are prices deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) using 1986 as base year. 
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Figure 2: Real Producer and Retail Prices for Poultry in ATS/kg (1973:1-1994:4)
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As can be seen in Figure 3, percentage margins3 in the Austrian meat market are high. 
Arguably, a fraction of these margins may be attributed to the exercise of market power as 
afforded by the high concentration in the meat retail sector. In a sample survey of consumers 
by Scheikl (1989, p. 52) on the Austrian meat market, 44% of the respondents were found to 
purchase meat from supermarkets. In 1994 large chain supermarkets accounted for about 
66% of total meat sales in Austria. Also, the proportion of the Austrian market occupied – in 
terms of market sales – by the top four food chains or supermarkets increased from 75.2% in 
1987 to 80.7% in 1994, indicating that a high degree of concentration exists in the Austrian 
meat retail sector. Digby (1989), argues that with some degree of market power, marketing 
chains and supermarkets may adopt a ‘wait and see approach’ in the short run and retain all 
or part of the benefits of cost decreases as added profits while passing on higher input costs 
immediately to consumers and producers. Similarly, when retailers have market power and 
are faced with increasing demand for a particular product or group of products, they will be 
able to reap super normal profits in the long run.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 Defined as the ratio of the marketing margin to the retail price expressed in percentages. 
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Figure 3: Percentage Margin for Pork and Poultry (1973:1-1994:4)
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The wholesale sector exhibits a structure analogous to that of the retail sector. For example, 
Pretterhofer et al. (1996) have shown that concentration in the meat wholesale 
(slaughterhouse) sector is quite high, with 6% of the firms accounting for about 50% of total 
wholesale sales per week in 1995. Similar to the observation of Hall et al. (1979) on the US 
beef market, however, the slaughterhouses face both intra-industry competitive pressures in 
obtaining livestock and retail competitive pressures due to the existence of substitute supply 
outlets, such that most of the firms are unable to operate at maximum capacity. In contrast to 
the retail sector, therefore, the wholesale sector is expected to operate on a very small 
margin. 
3. Methodology  
3.1 Price Determination 
When dealing with prices at different marketing levels such as farm and retail prices where 
M  is the marketing margin, while Pf  represents the price of the farm component of a retail 
good priced at Pr , then the relationship between the three variables can be represented 
linearly as: 
P M Pr f= +   (1) 
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Following Tomek and Robinson (1995 p. 44), the margin M  is generally specified as the 
linear combination of a constant absolute amount c  and a percentage (markup) a  of the 
retail price such that:  
M c aPr= +   (2) 
where 0 £ c  and 0 1£ <a . 
It follows from equations (1) and (2) that  
P c aP Pr r f= + +  (3) 
Þ =
-
+
-
P
a
c
a
Pr f
1
1
1
1
 (4) 
If a = 0 , equation (4) reduces to the case of the constant absolute margin: 
M c P Pr f= = -  (5) 
Equation (4) can be rewritten in the reduced form as: 
P c a Pr f= +
* *  (6) 
where c
a
c* =
-
1
1
 and a
a
* =
-
1
1
.  
When retailers have market power, they influence prices strategically. As a result, they are 
able to hold prices above marginal costs by charging retail markups. Thus, under a situation 
of market power, it is expected that a  is strictly greater than zero (i.e., 0 1< <a ) so that 
a* > 1 in equation (6). On the other hand, competitive firms bid prices down to marginal 
cost levels. Consequently, equation (5) will correspond to the perfectly competitive case 
where a = 0 .  
Also, in Figure 3, percentage margin defined as 
M
Pr
 becomes 
c aP
P
c
P
ar
r r
+
= + , for retailers with market power and 
c
Pr
, for retailers facing 
perfect competition. 
In case Pr  and Pf are nonstationary in the regression equation: 
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P c a Pr t t f t t, ,= + +
* * e  (7) 
et  must be stationary if equation (7) is true in the long run. Given that both producer and 
retail prices follow non-stationary processes as confirmed by the results in Tables 1 and 2, 
equation (7) may be estimated using cointegration techniques that properly account for non-
stationarity properties.  
Equation (7) is a representation of the first step of the Engle-Granger (EG) (1987) 
cointegration technique. The EG technique examines bivariate relationships and a 
subsequent test for stationarity of the residuals by means of ordinary least squares. In a 
multivariate system, the EG approach leads to a partial analysis. The limitations of the EG 
approach have been addressed by Hendry and Mizon (1992) and Banerjee et al. (1993) – 
among others. Hendry and Mizon (op. cit.) emphasize that under certain conditions, 
cointegration analysis within a partial system might be inefficient. Johansen (1988, 1991, 
1992) provides a more suitable way of testing for cointegration within a multivariate (also 
bivariate) framework by means of ML techniques. Moreover, Johansen and Juselius (1992) 
have shown that the ML framework is well suited to the issue of price convergence. 
3.2 The Model 
Cointegration relationships between the respective farm and retail prices of pork and poultry 
( ; )P and P P and Ppf cf pr cr  in Austria are estimated using the Johansen ML procedure 
taking the form of a vector error correction (VEC) representation: 
D G D Fp p p Dt i t i
i
k
t k t t= + + +-
=
- -å Õ
1
1
~ e  (8) 
where the reduced rank of the n n´  matrix of Õ equals the number of cointegration 
vectors r n£ - 1  in the system and n  equals the number of series in question. Thus, 
Õ can be written as ( )=Õ a mb / , where a  and b  are both of the dimension n r´  
and rank r . The constant m  is a scalar restricted to the cointegration space and 
~ ( , )/ /p pt k t k- - - -=1 1 1 . This specification assumes that there are no linear trends in the 
levels of the data as roughly depicted by Figures 1 and 2. The effect of m  is to capture the 
constant absolute portion of the long-run marketing margin. The matrix b  contains the 
cointegrating vectors 
i
b , i.e., b b b= ( ...... )i r  while the matrix of the adjustment 
coefficients a  describes the speed of adjustment of the particular series D pi t,  to deviations 
from the cointegration relationships.  
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Choice of the appropriate lag-length k was based on model selection criteria and also on the 
issue of whether the residuals are Gaussian, i.e., e t N~ ( , )0 L , conditional on a set of I(0) 
variables, Dt  that are weakly exogenous. Swine production exhibits seasonal patterns – the 
so-called hog cycle. Turkey consumption also rises at Christmas. One would therefore 
expect some seasonal features in the data. In the analysis, Dt  consists of centered 
seasonal dummies which are used to account for any deterministic seasonal behaviour that 
may be present in the price data and a point dummy variable (in the case of poultry) to 
account for an outlier for the period 1973:3. Centered seasonal dummies sum to zero over 
time and thus, they do not affect the asymptotic distributions upon which statistical tests 
depend.  
Having established the number of cointegrating vectors, tests of structural hypotheses (to 
verify the long-run market behaviour or retail pricing strategy) on the cointegrating vectors 
are performed. Following Johansen and Juselius (op. cit.), the combined hypotheses 
H Hi ib b: = F for i r= 1,....,  are tested, with fixed n si´  matrices Hi  indicating the linear 
economic hypothesis to be tested on each of the r cointegration relations and the si ´1  
vectors F i  of freely estimated parameters: 
b b b b= =( , ,....., ) ( , ,......, )1 2 1 1 2 2r r rH H HF F F  
The Likelihood Ratio (LR)-statistics for the combined hypotheses, given the number of 
cointegrating vectors, is asymptotically standard c m
2 – distributed, where m denotes the 
number of over-identifying restrictions on b . Beginning with a just-identifying restriction (i.e., 
normalizing on the coefficient relating to the retail price) to achieve identification along the 
lines of equation (6), an over-identifying restriction (i.e., homogeneity restriction: 
b bretail farm= -  or a
* = 1  in equation (6)) is imposed on the a*  coefficient in order to verify 
whether a = 0  and that the pricing behaviour of retail firms corresponds to the perfectly 
competitive case as exemplified by equation (5). 
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4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Data 
Quarterly producer and retail prices of pork and poultry for the period 1973:1 to 1994:4 were 
used. 1973:1 represented the period in which prices net of value added tax began to be 
recorded, and 1994:4 represented the last quarter prior to Austria’s entry into the EU and as 
such, the end of extreme border protection, trade management and possibly oligopolistic 
behaviour of meat retailers. The retail values of carcass were calculated from price data on a 
range of cuts, using their respective weights in the consumer price index4 and scaling these 
weights such that they add up to unity. This should make the resulting retail prices 
comparable to producer prices.5 All data are in real values in order to isolate the analysis 
from inflationary factors. The data were kindly provided by Karl M. Ortner of the Federal 
Institute of Agricultural Economics, Vienna6 and are described in the ALFIS data bank. The 
data were collected by Statistik Österreich as part of the Austrian Consumer Price Index 
survey. 
Following Engle, Granger and Hallman’s (1989) suggestion with respect to the effects on 
integration and cointegration of using series containing strong seasonal components, the 
series in question were subjected to seasonal unit root tests. Referring to Table 1, pork 
prices were found to have unit roots at the zero frequency, whilst poultry prices featured unit 
roots at the semiannual frequency. None of the price series, however, featured unit roots at 
the annual frequency.  
Table 1: Results of seasonal unit root tests for price series 
Series Constant t( )g 1  t( )g 2  t( )g 3  t( )g 4  F( )g g3 4Ç  
Pork farm price  -1.847 -0.270 4.311** 4.367** 1.029 18.972** 
Pork retail price  -2.968 -0.650 4.507** 5.003** 1.297 30.286** 
Poultry farm price  -3.806 6.577** -0.140 6.051** -4.527** 25.492** 
Poultry retail price -7.183 7.317** -1.423 3.656** -5.456** 17.732** 
     ** indicates rejection of null hypothesis at the 5% level. 
Null hypothesis: g g g g1 2 3 40 0 0= = Ç =, ,  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 The factors used were 0.253 for the flunk, 0.305 for ham, 0.217 for the shoulder butt and 0.299 for the loin - in the 
case of pork - according to the weight of these cuts in the consumer price index.  
5 To compute exactly comparable prices, one would need the retail prices for all cuts which are made from 
carcasses. The cuts for which prices are available were assumed to be representative of those, but by this 
assumption retail prices are likely to have been overestimated.  
6 Bundesanstalt für Agrarwirtschaft. 
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Engle and Granger (op. cit.) argue that, if two series of interest contain unit roots at the zero 
frequency and if the existence of seasonal unit roots cannot be rejected in at least one of the 
series, the possible presence of seasonal unit roots means that the standard EG 
cointegration procedure lacks consistency. In order to make the analysis for poultry 
comparable on the same frequency as that of pork, the unit root components at the semi-
annual frequency were filtered out with the following filter suggested by Hylleberg et al. 
(1990): 
x S B Pt c t= ( ) ,2  
where S B B B B B( ) ( ) / ( )( ) ( )2
4 21 1 1 1= - - + = +  and xt  is the filtered series. 
Table 2 presents the results of the seasonal unit root tests performed on the filtered farm and 
retail prices of poultry. Both filtered price series have unit roots at the zero frequency but no 
unit roots at the semi-annual and annual frequencies. 
Table 2: Results of seasonal unit root tests for filtered poultry price series 
Series Constant t( )g 1  t( )g 2  t( )g 3  t( )g 4  F( )g g3 4Ç  
Poultry farm price  -2.510 -0.354 3.418** 5.173** 0.795 18.952** 
Poultry retail price  -5.215 -1.783 5.314** 3.092**9 2.232** 11.008** 
    ** indicate rejection of null hypothesis at the 5% level. 
Null hypothesis: g g g g1 2 3 40 0 0= = Ç =, , . 
 
4.2 Cointegration Analysis 
Results of the cointegration analysis are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Cheung and Lai (1993) 
suggest that the trace test shows more robustness to both skewness and excess kurtosis in 
(the residuals) than the maximum eigenvalue ( lmax ) test. Following this proposition, the 
choice of the rank r was based on the trace test. Choice of the lag length was based on 
Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC). According to the SBC, a lag length of one was found to 
be appropriate for both cointegration analyses. Also, there was only one cointegration vector 
at the 1% level of significance in both analyses.  
In the case of poultry, the Ljung-Box (LB) test for residual autocorrelation which is based on 
the estimated auto- and crosscorrelations of the first (T/4)7 lags, rejected null hypothesis of 
no autocorellation. The null hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed was also 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 T is the length of the series. 
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rejected. All this could have been due to the heterogeneity of this category (see also Jumah 
and Kunst, op. cit.). The reliability of the estimates for poultry prices is therefore based on 
the significance of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM)-type tests for first and fourth order 
autocorrelation. Although the estimation results would be more reliable if the overall model 
conformed to the assumptions that the disturbances are serially independent and normally 
distributed, the first point is the more critical one.  
Residual autocorrelation was strong in the pork price model. The presence of large residual 
autocorrelation could imply that there are other unobserved variables that could explain the 
model. It would be expected that conditioning on the labour variable would correct residual 
misspecification, since labour costs influence the marketing chain. However, autocorrelation 
in the residuals persisted after conditioning on the labour variable.  
Johansen (1992) has shown that, if in equation (8), for example, the farm price of pork 
( DPpf t, ) does not respond to deviations from the long-run equilibrium 
b
m
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ - -
/
~pt k 1 , i.e., if 
the corresponding rows of the short-run adjustment coefficients a  are zero, then DPpf t,  is 
weakly exogenous with respect to a  and b  (see also Engle et al. 1983). Having found 
DPpf t, to be weakly exogenous to the system as indicated in Table 4, equation (8) was 
modified by handling DPpf t,  as a conditioning variable
8. Characteristically, equation (8) is 
split into the partial model: 
D G D G D FP P p p Dpr t pf t i
pr
t i
i
k
pr
t k
pr
t t
pr
, ,
/
~= + +
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ + +-
=
- -å0
1
1a
b
m
e  (9) 
for pork retail price DPpr t,  only - where the dynamics of the latter is conditioned on DPpf t,  - 
and the marginal model: 
D G D FP p Dpf t i
Pf
t i
i
k
Pf
t t
Pf
, = + +-
=
å
1
e  (10) 
for the farm price of pork DPpf t, . Under such circumstances, cointegration analysis might be 
equivalently based on the partial model for DPpr t, . Urbain (1995) has shown that estimating 
equation (9) might result in considerable efficiency gains (especially, in large systems) as 
compared to equation (8) and it has the additional advantage that the estimation does not 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
8 Conditioning in this sense means that DPpf t,  enters the cointegration space, i.e., it appears in the long-run 
model. 
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rely on the correct specification of the process for the conditioning variable DPpf t, . Equation 
(9) was therefore used instead of equation (8) in the case of pork.  
Table 3: Results of zero frequency cointegration tests 
Normality test Item Lag length Trace 
statistic# 
ß Constant Q(21) LM(1) LM(4) 
c 2  P-value 
Pork 1 50.94 
4.55* 
2.113 35.463 0 0 0 c 2 4( ) = 
9.015 
0.06 
Pork§ 1 - 2.131 35.257 0.06 0.04 0.11 c 2 2( ) = 
2.923 
0.23 
Poultry 1 65.31 
3.91* 
0.873 48.926 0 0.36 0.10 c 2 4( ) = 
72.35 
0.00 
§ Partial model for pork. 
# For critical values of trace statistics see Osterwald-Lenum (1992) 
* significant at the 1%. 
Table 4: Results of tests for weak exogeneity 
Item Test LR statistic P-value 
Pork arp = 0  c
2 1 31 34( ) .=  0.00 
Pork a fp = 0  c
2 1 151( ) .=  0.22 
Poultry arc = 0  c
2 1 57 04( ) .=  0.00 
Poultry a fc = 0  c
2 1 36 83( ) .=  0.00 
 
The cointegration vectors are presented in normalised form, by setting the first element (i.e., 
the retail price) of b /  equal to unity. Based on these normalised cointegration vectors, 
equation (6) can be derived for pork as: 
P Ppr t pf t, ,. .= +35 257 2 131  (11) 
and that for poultry as: 
P Pcr t cf t,
*
,
*. .= +48 926 0 873  (12) 
where P P Pcr t cr t cr t,
*
, ,= + -1  and P P Pcf t cf t cf t,
*
, ,= + -1 , i.e., the filtered price series. 
I H S — Jumah / The Long Run, Market Power and Retail Pricing — 13 
4.3 Structural Tests 
Table 5 presents the results of the structural test as to whether the restriction implied by 
competition can be rejected. The test which is performed by imposing over-identifying 
restrictions on the cointegration space related to equations (8) and (9) - based on the 
hypothesis that b bretail farm= -  in equations (8) and (9) or a
* = 1  in equation (6) - is 
implemented using: 
H H: ( , )b j=  (13) 
 (see, Johansen and Juselius, 1992), where H  is ( )n r´  with known elements, and j  is 
the ( )s r´  matrix of unknown parameters. s  represents the number of unrestricted 
parameters. The H matrix for the hypothesis involving one restriction is given by:  
H = -
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
ú
1 0
1 0
0 1
 (14) 
The resulting LR test is based on the c m
2 – distribution, where m denotes the number of 
over-identifying restrictions. The results indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected in the 
case of pork but accepted in the case of poultry.  
Table 5: Results of the tests for overidentifying restrictions 
Item Test Pretail  Pfarm  Constant LR statistic P-value 
Pork H ß=  1 -1 -54.325 c
2 1 2134( ) .=  0.00 
Poultry H ß=  1 -1 -47.555 c
2 1 0 30( ) .=  0.59 
 
This implies that equation (2) is valid for pork; it also means that 
1
1
2 131
-
=
a
.  and 
a = 0 531.  in the case of pork. Having solved for a , c  can be derived from 
c* = 35 257. , which implies that c = 16 536. . Thus, the long-run margin equation for pork 
in the reference period was: 
M Pr= +16 536 0 531. .  (15) 
Retailers charged a mark up of about half the retail price for pork plus an absolute constant 
margin of 16.54 ATS in the long run.  
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For poultry, the results indicate that the price relationship followed equation (5) - the 
constant absolute margin. Based on the estimated equations, the long-run price equation for 
poultry was: 
P Pr f» +24 46.  (16) 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
The study uses the Johansen cointegration approach to analyse long-run pricing strategies 
of pork and poultry retailers in their isolated markets in Austria. Retailers charged pork 
consumers a markup of about twice the farm price or half the retail price of pork in addition to 
a constant margin. On the other hand, mark-up pricing was virtually absent in the poultry 
market. This is translated as the existence of market power in the pork retail market and 
competitive behaviour in the poultry retail market.  
It is, however, unclear what the driving forces behind the pricing strategies are. Presumably, 
retailers base their pricing strategies on relative demand shares for product. Pork accounted 
for about 57% of the total meat consumption in Austria whilst poultry meat accounted for 
14% in the reference period (Handshur, op. cit.). 
A comparison of the results to a former study in Austria (Jumah, 1996) and similar studies in 
Australia (McDonald and Spindler, 1987; Griffith et al., 1991; Hyde and Perloff, op. cit.) 
showed that analysing several markets simultaneously rather than examining markets in 
isolation is likely to reveal evidence of competitiveness when the alternative evidence for the 
existence of market power is true.  
The paper also revealed the versatility of the Johansen cointegration technique as a tool 
capable of analysing both competitive and imperfect market situations. The results indicate 
that meat policy should be product specific rather than holistic. 
I H S — Jumah / The Long Run, Market Power and Retail Pricing — 15 
References 
Azzam, A. M. and Pagoulatos, E. (1990): Testing Oligopolistic and Oligopsonostic Behaviour: 
an Application to the US Meat Packing Industry, Journal of Agricultural Economics 41, 
362–370. 
Banerjee, A., Dolado, J., and Hendry D. F. (1993): Co-Integration, Error Correction, and the 
Econometric Analysis of Nonstationary Data, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Barrett, Christopher B. (1996): Market Analysis Methods: Are Our Enriched Toolkits Well 
Suited to Enlivened Markets? American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78(3), 825–
829. 
Charemza, W. W. and Deadman, D. F. (1992): New Directions in Econometric Practice: 
General to Specific Modelling, Cointegration and Vector Autoregression, Edward Elgar, 
Aldershot.  
Cheung, Y.-W. and Lai, K. S. (1993): Finite-Sample Sizes of Johansen’s Likelihood Ratio 
Tests for Cointegration, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 55, 313–28. 
Digby, M. P. (1989): Marketing Margins in the Meat Sector, England and Wales 1978–1987, 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 40(2), 2129–142. 
Eichner, A. S. (1973): A Theory of the Determination of the Mark-up Under Oligopoly, 
Economic Journal 83(332), 1184–1200. 
Engle, R. F. and Granger, C. W. J. (1987): Cointegration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation and Testing, Econometrica 51, 277–301. 
Engle, R. F. and Yoo, S. B. (1987): Co-integrated Economic Time Series: An Overview with 
New Results, European Meeting of the Econometric Society in Copenhagen, 24–28 
August 1987.  
Engle, R. F., Hendry, D. F., and Richard, J. F. (1983): Exogeneity, Econometrica 51, 277–
304.  
Engle, R. F., Granger, C. W. J., and Hallman J. (1989): Merging Short- and Long-run 
Forecasts: An Application of Seasonal Cointegration to Monthly electricity Sales 
Forecasting, Journal of Econometrics 57, 339–409. 
16 — Jumah / The Long Run, Market Power and Retail Pricing — I H S 
Faminow, M. and Benson B. (1990): Integration of Spatial Markets, American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 72, 49–62. 
Gardner, L. B. (1975): The Farm-Retail Price Spread in a Competitive Food Industry, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 57, 339–409. 
Granger, C. W. J. (1969): Investigating Causal Relations by econometric Models and Cross-
Spectral Methods, Econometrica 37, 424–438. 
Griffith, G. R. and Moore, W. B. (1991): Livestock Production Policies and Meat Processing 
Margins: The Case of New Zealand, 1967–1988, Australian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 35(19), 21–48. 
Griffith, G. R., Green, W., and Duff, G. L. (1991): Another Look at Price Levelling and Price 
Averaging in the Sydney Meat Market, Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 
59(2), 189–201. 
Hall, R. E. (1988): The Relationship between Price and Marginal Cost in the US Industry, 
Journal of Political Economy 96(5), 921–947. 
Hall, L., Schmitz, A., and Cothern, J. (1979): Beef Wholesale-Retail Marketing Margins and 
Concentration, Economica 46, 265–300. 
Handschur, P. (1991): Markt für Lebendvieh und Fleisch: In: Breuer et al. (eds.) 
Agrarmarketing in Österreich, Service Fachverlag Wien. 
Hansen, H. and Juselius, K. (1995): CATS in RATS. Cointegration Analysis of Time Series, 
Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Estima, Evanston, IL. 
Heien, D. L. (1980): Markup Pricing in a Dynamic Model of the Food Industry, American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 62, 10–18. 
Hendry, D. F. and Mizon, G. E. (1992): Evaluating Dynamic Models by Encompassing the 
VAR in Models in Methods and Applications of Econometrics (Ed.) P. C. B. Phillips and 
V. B. Hall, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Holloway, G. J. (1991): The Farm-Retail Spread in an Imperfectly Competitive Food Industry, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73, 979–989. 
Hyde, C. E. and Perloff, J. M. (1998): Multimarket Power Estimation: the Australian Retail 
Meat Sector, Applied Economics 30(9), 1169–1176. 
I H S — Jumah / The Long Run, Market Power and Retail Pricing — 17 
Hylleberg, S., Engle, R. F., Granger, C. W. J., and Yoo, B. S. (1990): Seasonal Integration 
and Cointegration, Journal of Econometrics 44, 215–238. 
Johansen, S. (1988): Statistical Analysis of Co-integrating Vectors, Journal of Economic 
Dynamic and Control 12, 231–254. 
Johansen, S. (1991): Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in 
Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models, Econometrica 59, 1551–1580. 
Johansen, S. (1992): Cointegration in Partial Systems and the Efficiency of Single Equation 
Analysis, Journal of Econometrics 52, 389–402. 
Johansen, S. and Juselius, K. (1992): Testing Structural Hypotheses in a Multivariate 
Cointegration Analysis of the PPP and the UIP for UK, Journal of Econometrics 53, 
211–244. 
Jumah, A. (1996): Market Structure, Marketing Margins and EU Membership: Evidence from 
the Austrian Meat Sector, Proceedings of the NFJ Seminar No. 264, Alnarp, Sweden, 
June 6–8.  
Jumah, A. and Kunst, R. M. (1996): Forecasting Seasonally Cointegrated Systems: Supply 
Response in Austrian Agriculture, European Review of Agricultural Economics 23, 487–
507. 
Karp, L. S. and Perloff, J. M. (1993): A Dynamic Model of Oligopoly in the Coffee Export 
Market, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75(2), 448–457. 
Karp, L. S. and Perloff, J. M. (1989): Dynamic Oligopoly in the Rice Export Market, Review of 
Economics and Statistics 71(3), 462–470. 
Larue, B. (1991): Farm Input, Farm Output and Retail Prices: A Cointegration Analysis, 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 39, 335–353. 
McCorriston, S., Morgan C. W., and Rayner, A. J. (1998): Processing Technology, Market 
Power and Price Transmission, Journal of Agricultural Economics 49(2), 185–201. 
McDonald, I. M. and Spindler, K. J. (1987): An Empirical Investigation of Customer Market 
Analysis – A Microfoundation for Macroeconomics, Applied Economics 19(9), 1149–
1174. 
18 — Jumah / The Long Run, Market Power and Retail Pricing — I H S 
Newbery, D. M. G. and Stiglitz J. E. (1984): Pareto Inferior Trade, Review of Economic 
Studies 51, 1–12. 
Palaskas, T. B. (1995): Statistical Analysis of Price Transmission in the European Union, 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 46(1), 61–69. 
Palaskas, T. B. and Crowe, T. J. (1996): Testing for Price Transmission with Seasonally 
Integrated Producer and Consumer Price Series from Agriculture, European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 23(4), 473–86. 
Panzer, J. C. and Rose, J. N. (1987): Testing for Monopoly Equilibrium, Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 35(4), 443–456. 
Parish, R. M. (1966): Price Levelling and Averaging, Farm Economist 11(1), 187–198. 
Pretterhofer, G., Stehlik, K., and Adler, W. (1996): Kapazitäten österreichischer 
Schlachtbetriebe, Unpublished Manuscript, Federal Institute of Agricultural Economics, 
Vienna. 
Scheikl, G. (1989): Rindfleisch im Verbraucherurteil als Grundlage einer breitangelegten 
Marketingstrategie – Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativerhebung in Österreich. 
Diplomarbeit an der Universität für Bodenkultur, Wien. 
Tomek, W. G. and Robinson K. L. (1995): Agricultural Product Prices, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca. 
Urbain, J. P. (1995): Partial versus Full System Modelling in Cointegration Series: An 
Empirical Illustration, Journal of Econometrics 69, 177–210. 
Wohlgenant, M. K. (1989): Demand for Farm Output in a Complete System of Demand 
Functions, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 71(2), 241–252. 
Zhoa, X., Griffith, G. R., and Mullen, J. D. (1996): The Comparative Structure of the 
Australian Meat and Livestock Industries, Contributed Paper at the 40th Annual 
Conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, University 
of Melbourne. 
 
Institut für Höhere Studien 
Institute for Advanced Studies 
Stumpergasse 56 
A-1060 Vienna 
Austria 
 
Phone:+43-1-599 91-145 
Fax: +43-1-599 91-163 
